E. Increased synchronization and globalization of macroeconomic shocks
This section describes the increased synchronization and spread of macroeconomic shocks in the last few years after what appeared to be a general moderation of volatility. It examines the role of global value chains in the transmission of macroeconomic shocks and looks at how export structures influence volatility. It describes how the economic crisis spread from developed to developing countries and how a coordinated response helped to limit the use of protectionist measures in the wake of the crisis. Despite suffering the greatest economic downturn since the 1930s, the world did not see a widespread resort to protectionism. Among other explanations for this was the existence of a set of multilateral trade rules. 
Some key facts and findings
Macroeconomic volatility is bad for development because it reduces economic growth and adversely affects the distribution of income. Before the onset of the economic crisis in 2008, volatility had been declining in developing countries.
The dramatic decline of trade in 2008-09 illustrated the dependency of developing economies on cyclical economic developments in developed countries, and vice versa. Beyond the fall in demand, other factors, such as the functioning of global value chains and the drying up of trade finance, explain the trade collapse.
Despite the severity of the global economic crisis, it produced no large-scale outbreak of trade protectionism. Empirical evidence suggests that being a member of the WTO has acted as a restraint to the use of trade-restrictive measures during the crisis and its aftermath.
G-20 developing countries contributed to the coordinated response to the crisis by using macroeconomic tools to stimulate their economies and by committing to refrain from erecting new trade barriers.
The spread of global value chains has increased linkages among countries, creating a common interest in preventing the spread of protectionism. Raising trade barriers would have proven to be ineffective in promoting economic recovery in the medium to longer term.
Macroeconomic volatility of developing economies
Macroeconomic volatility is bad for development because it can reduce economic growth, make it difficult for households to smooth their consumption and adversely affect the distribution of income. Macroeconomic volatility is defined here as volatility in the cyclical component of GDP, i.e. volatility around the trend growth of GDP. 1
Beginning with the pioneering work by Ramey and Ramey (1995) , a significant stream of literature has showed a negative relationship between macroeconomic volatility and growth (Martin and Rogers, 2000; Aghion and Banerjee, 2005; Hnatkovska and Loayza, 2005) . The principal channel through which volatility reduces growth is through its damaging effect on capital accumulation as it makes the returns on investment in human and physical capital more uncertain. Welfare losses may also arise because of the difficulty in smoothing consumption as a result of investment constraints which tend to be more severe in developing countries (Loayza et al., 2007) . A number of empirical studies have also found that volatility worsens income inequality (Inter-American Development Bank, 1995; Breen and Garcia-Penalosa, 2005; Laursen and Mahajan, 2005) .
Developing countries as a group exhibit more macroeconomic volatility than developed countries (Agénor and Montiel, 2008) . This is shown in Figure E .1 where the volatility of developed and developing countries before 2000 is compared with the period since then. In both time periods, developing countries had higher volatility than developed countries. For both groups of countries, volatility was lower in the later period. The sources of this volatility in developing countries can be broken down into domestic and external factors (Loayza et al., 2007) .
External factors refer to the openness of a country to trade and its integration with the global economy in the areas of goods, services and finance. Domestic factors include the economic structure, particularly the supply side, institutions and the conduct of fiscal, monetary and exchange rate policy (Fatás and Mihov, 2013) . These domestic and external factors are not necessarily independent. For instance, supply-side constraints may make a country dependent on a narrow range of commodities for export and fiscal revenues. If the country is open to trade and is a price taker in international markets (i.e. not sufficiently big to influence market prices), commodity price volatility can easily translate into macroeconomic turmoil. The following sections focus on trade openness and the interaction between sectoral concentration and openness as channels of macroeconomic volatility. 2 (a) Trade openness and volatility First, we examine trade openness and its effect on macroeconomic volatility. The trade literature suggests that openness can in some circumstances accentuate macroeconomic volatility but that it might also have a dampening effect. Countries with closer trade links tend to have more tightly correlated business cycles (Frankel and Rosen, 2008) . This suggests that trade acts as a transmission mechanism for spreading a country-specific shock to others. In the context of the recent economic crisis, some have argued that trade was a major channel of transmission that made the crisis global (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2010) .
A number of authors have highlighted the role of global value chains in the transmission of macroeconomic shocks. For instance, Lee et al. (1997) have pointed to the "bullwhip effect", 3 which refers to how small changes in final demand can cause a big change in the demand for intermediate goods along the value chain. Higher volatility can be driven by the increased vertical integration of value chains, which synchronizes business cycles (Di Giovanni and Levchenko, 2010) . Greater trade openness also means more exposure to external economic shocks, with the most outward-oriented industries being the most vulnerable. Some empirical evidence for this is based on industry-level data (Di Giovanni and Levchenko, 2009) . Focusing on small economies, Easterly and Kraay (2000) find that these countries exhibit greater macroeconomic volatility and that this is explained by their greater openness and sensitivity to terms-of-trade shocks. 
E. INCREASED SYNCHRONIZATION AND GLOBALIZATION OF MACROECONOMIC SHOCKS
relationship between openness and macroeconomic volatility although, as discussed below, one must be careful about this relationship.
However, there is also evidence that trade openness can reduce volatility. If country-wide shocks are dominant, the impact of trade on volatility can be negative because trade becomes a source of diversification (Tenreyro et al., 2012) . For example, trade allows domestic goods producers to respond to shocks to the domestic supply chain by shifting sourcing abroad. Similarly, when a country has multiple trading partners, a domestic recession or a recession in any one of the trading partners translates into a smaller demand shock for its producers than when trade is more limited. The effect of openness also interacts with the underlying structure of exports, which is noted by Haddad et al. (2012) . They show that, for a significant proportion of countries that have relatively diversified exports, the effect of openness on volatility is negative.
(b) Export structure matters
The link between macroeconomic volatility and the structure of a country's export basket has been examined in a number of studies. In the case of African countries, Kose and Riezman (2001) find that, because a significant proportion of their exports are concentrated in a narrow range of primary commodities, terms-of-trade shocks account for 45 per cent of the volatility in their aggregate output. Moreover, adverse trade shocks cause prolonged recessions since they lead to a significant decrease in aggregate investment. In the context of the recent global crisis, commodity exporters faced demand and price declines that translated into greater output volatility. For developing countries that are part of manufacturing global value chains, producers of durable goods were badly affected by the global crisis because long-term investments were postponed (Baldwin, 2009 ). This translated into GDP volatility due to the large role of capital expenditures in aggregate demand.
(c) Declining volatility over time Another feature of macroeconomic volatility in developing countries has been its decline since the mid-1990s before it spiked up again around the time of the Great Recession of 2008-09. Figure E .3 shows macroeconomic volatility over time by groups of countries. Members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) are used to represent developed countries. The figure includes all developing countries as well as sub-groups of themleast-developed countries (LDCs), LDC oil exporters, members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), and small island states. All the groupings of developing countries show higher volatility than OECD This picture is consistent with the "great moderation", the term used to describe the long-term decline in output and inflation volatility in the G-7 group of industrial countries that began at about this time (Kim and Nelson (1999) examined below (the drying up of trade credit, workings of modern supply chains and the wait-and-see attitude among consumers throughout the world).
The macroeconomic outcome of this crisis propagation has been the synchronization of business cycles across regions, including between developed and developing countries -during both the downswing and the upswing (see Figure E .4), in a mutually reinforcing manner. Table E .1 and by Baldwin (2009), the "compositional" and "synchronized" nature of this dramatic fluctuation in demand explains, in part, its peculiar nature. The compositional effect is linked to the fact that the demand shock was large but very concentrated in a narrow category of goods (machinery, electronic and telecommunications equipment, automotive products) and intermediate products which are key components of today's supply chains for the production of durable goods. During the crisis, global trade proved to be more cyclical than GDP because of the high density of such products (60 per cent of trade) in total trade. The trade collapse spread from downstream to upstream production as large developing countries, in which demand for manufactured goods had fallen, reduced their purchases of commodities and raw material, often exported by low-income countries.
As indicated in
As noted above, research has suggested that only a share of the "great trade collapse" could be attributed to the drop in aggregate demand -70 per cent, according to Eaton et al. (2011) , leaving some 30 per cent to be attributed to other factors.
Among the other factors is the contraction of trade finance, linked to the credit crunch that resulted from the wider crisis of the international financial sector. Trade finance is the lifeblood of trade as most trade transactions are financed by some form of credit, guarantee and/or insurance. The role of trade finance has been highlighted by a growing stream of literature confirming the links between external (trade) finance vulnerability and the performance of traders (Chor and Manova, 2012; Amiti and Weinstein, 2011; Auboin and Engemann, 2012) (2007) had estimated that spill-overs from advanced economies to developing economies had "decreased substantially" since the 1990s. In an effort to improve its understanding of "global interconnectedness" -in particular the spread of shocksthe International Monetary Fund (IMF) introduced a new macroeconomic surveillance framework in 2012 at the multilateral level, with the objective of better evaluating spill-overs in a world more open to trade and capital movements (International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2011a , 2011b , 2012a . One of the new approaches is to "connect the dots" of economies through "cluster network analysis", focusing on the relations between three categories of actors: the global core group of economies (the "systemic-5"); clusters of economies within which connections are closer than outside (e.g. Nordic-Baltics); and "gatekeepers" or connectors that link clusters to one another and the core of the clusters (e.g. China appears as a gatekeeper to the Asian supply chains). Source: WTO Secretariat estimates based on mirror data from the GTIS Global Trade Atlas database.
their suppliers in developing countries, which, in turn, could not rely on the local banking sector to support them (Auboin, 2009) . Shortages of trade finance in some developing countries prompted the G-20 to provide US$ 250 billion in trade finance liquidity and guarantees over two years. 4 A consensus has also developed about the role of the "supply-chain" channel, which accounts for another important cause of the "great trade collapse". With the unbundling of production, the "just-in-time nature" of vertically integrated production networks (as described by Baldwin) tends to lead to the spread of demand shocks more rapidly through "factory online". Better information flows between links in the supply chain was another reason for the trade collapse, with real-time information on sales by retailers quickly becoming known to upstream producers. Di Giovanni and Levchenko (2010) and Li and Lu (2009) have described the process of vertical integration of production across countries.
Engel and Wang (2011) have documented the role of the composition of trade, notably that of durable goods, in the volatility of trade. Alessandria et al. (2012) have focused on the movement of trade that cannot be accounted for by composition. They have found that inventories account for a sizable fraction of import collapses in the recent global recession. Partly because international trade takes time and is costly, firms engaging in it tend to hold larger stocks of inventories. These movements in inventories generate larger fluctuation in international trade than in GDP. Inventory movements among suppliers may actually be larger than for producers of final goods -inventory movements may be less optimal too.
Trade protectionism has had a much smaller influence than any of the factors mentioned above. Section E.3 analyses in depth the patterns of trade-restrictive measures taken since the economic crisis. The response appears to be muted given the severity of the crisis. Thanks to governments' heightened awareness of the economic risks of protectionism, the existence of multilateral trade rules, which have made resorting to "open" protectionism more difficult, and the WTO's commitment to increase trade monitoring, the rise of protectionism has been of limited intensity. Using product level data, Henn and McDonald (2011) show that protectionist measures on aggregate may have reduced global trade by only 0.2 per cent but they also highlight that backdoor or "murky" protectionism, through the use of behind-the-border non-tariff measures rather than tariff increases, as witnessed since 2009, still remains possible. 
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(b) Developing economies are part of the policy response
To be effective, a coordinated policy response requires the participation not only of developed economies but also of developing economies, given their weight in world output and trade. At the G-20 summit meeting in London (April 2009), G-20 developing countries agreed to participate with developed countries in the announced programme of fiscal and monetary stimulus to boost domestic demand (by some 2 per cent of GDP). They also committed to respecting the "stand-still" clause on protectionism, thereby refraining from using policy space allowed by their WTO commitments (such as raising tariffs to their "bound" limits and using flexibilities in the area of non-tariff measures). By keeping their markets open and allowing some predictability of market access in difficult times, G-20 developing countries have played their part in the resolution of the crisis (see Section F.3(d)).
Low-income countries have been on the receiving end of the global economic shock, despite having little or no responsibility for its origins. They have suffered from knock-on effects such as reduced trade finance availability (Auboin, 2013), reduced remittances from workers living abroad, and lower demand for raw materials and commodities. Dabla-Norris and Gündèz (2012) have showed that the amplitude and frequency of economic shocks tend to be higher in low-income countries than in advanced and developing country G-20 members. The authors argue that standard models in which negative shocks result in a quick bounce back to earlier levels of income do not apply to low-income countries, which do not have the policy instruments, adequate reserves and diversified economic structures to mitigate the impact of such large external crises.
(c) Low-income countries There is little doubt that the combination of strong internal growth (including domestic demand), the growing share of G-20 developing countries in global trade and particularly in intra-regional trade, and better macroeconomic fundamentals have contributed to ensuring higher growth levels in developing economies than in developed countries since mid-2011. As noted by Cattaneo et al. (2010) , large corporations are reorienting their production and exports from developed towards G-20 developing countries, where demand is the most dynamic. Smaller developing countries, in the vicinity of the larger developing countries, are also orienting their exports to these regional clusters to benefit from their higher growth.
Figure E.6 underlines this finding via bilateral trade growth rates of selected G-20 developing countries. In all four of these countries (Brazil, China, India and Indonesia), export growth to other G-20 developing countries was significantly higher than growth to developed countries. This is the case for China and India especially. In the recovery period immediately after the crisis, China's exports to Brazil and Russia were particularly high. In the same period, India's exports to Indonesia and Brazil peaked.
Trade policy reaction to the crisis
A number of trade theorists have argued that when trade agreements are self-enforcing, 5 levels of protection are likely to be counter-cyclical, i.e. in the opposite direction to the business cycle (Bagwell and Staiger, 2003a (a) Trade policy response
As indicated above, the trade policy response to the economic crisis was marked by the absence of a surge of protectionism. Box E.2 illustrates the potential risks involved if wide-scale protectionism had erupted. Some developing countries took trade-restrictive measures, but not to the extent that past behaviour would have suggested. Furthermore, data show that developing countries also took trade-opening measures. The focus of the analysis below is on the developing countries in the G-20, not only because they are economically important but also because a lot more information is available on their trade actions.
(i) Pattern of trade-restrictive measures
We begin by looking at recent empirical research on the trade policy response of developing countries in the wake of the crisis. The study by Bown and Crowley (2013a) focuses on the trade remedy actions (anti-dumping, countervailing and safeguard measures) taken by a group of Two qualifications need to be made. First, the WTO's monitoring reports only include trade policy measures covered by multilateral trade rules and consequently omit other measures that can have discriminatory trade effects. Governments intent on raising barriers to trade and prevented from using a particular policy instrument because of multilateral rules have the leeway to use other measures, unconstrained by WTO rules, which will have similar discriminatory trade effects (the problem of "policy substitution"). 8 This is an important point when the issue of financial sector bailouts is discussed below. Secondly, as suggested by Gregory et al. (2010) and Henn and McDonald (2011) , while the coverage of trade-restrictive measures may be small, the impact of the measures on the affected trade can be significant. They estimate that trade between partners subjected to the measures decreased by 5 per cent to 8 per cent relative to trade in the same product among partners not subject to similar measures. While useful, the number of measures may not give a good indication of the measures' possible impact on trade. To complement these data, we calculate the amount of trade covered by the restrictive trade measures implemented that year, while recognizing that this is also an imperfect measure of their impact. To see this, suppose the trade-restrictive measure manages to eliminate imports altogether. In this case, the trade covered by the restrictive measure is zero which can lead to the mistaken conclusion that the measure has no effect on trade. The trade data are matched with the trade measures in the WTO monitoring database and are shown in Figure E .8. Note that the trade coverage data exclude exports and are available only for 2010-12.
In contrast to the count data, which suggest that the most utilized measures were trade remedy instruments, the trade coverage data imply this finding is only true for developed G-20 countries. G-20 developing countries, in contrast, tended to rely on other measures, such as import duties, customs procedures and even local content requirement rules. Interestingly, the trade coverage of their restrictive measures appeared to grow over time. Nonetheless, in any given year the new measures covered only a small amount of world imports. In 2012, for example, the new measures enacted that year by the G-20 economies amounted to about 1.3 per cent of world imports. G-20 developing countries' restrictive measures affected a larger share of world imports than developed countries' measures.
(
ii) Liberalization measures
The analysis of trade-restrictive measures only gives half of the story since the other feature of the policy response to the crisis is the simultaneous lowering of trade barriers. Overall, the trade flow information from the WTO monitoring database suggests that the share of world trade affected by restrictive trade measures is not high and that G-20 developing countries also liberalized their trade during this period much more than developed countries. The analysis is consistent with the conclusions drawn by many others that there was no significant increase in trade protectionism during the crisis.
(b) Coordinated macroeconomic response
One possible reason for this result is countries' use of macroeconomic policies which would have dispensed with the need to use trade policy to manage the adverse impact of the crisis on incomes and jobs (Eichengreen and Irwin, 2010) . In the early phase of the crisis, this macroeconomic response was quite coordinated.
The early post-crisis period (2009-10) saw the G-20 countries increase discretionary fiscal expenditures by an average of 2 per cent of GDP (see Table E .2), although a few countries' stimulus programmes exceeded 5 per cent of GDP. Based on the evidence in this table, the amount of fiscal stimuli (as a share of GDP) did not differ significantly between developed and developing country members of the G-20. Source: Authors' calculations using data from WTO monitoring database and UN Comtrade.
Note: Includes only measures that were confirmed by G-20 countries and that are not withdrawn in the same year. Following the practice of the WTO monitoring reports, termination of a trade remedy measure is counted as a liberalizing measure.
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A salient feature of the fiscal policy response was the enormous assistance given to the financial sector and some manufacturing industries (e.g. the auto industry). In the financial sector, the support measures included the injection of capital and extension of loans to banks, provision of guarantees, and swapping government securities for the illiquid assets held by banks. There was a huge difference in the amount of support extended by developed G-20 countries and that provided by G-20 developing countries. In part, this reflected the fact that the crisis originated in and was centred on a number of the developed economies. The pledged amounts were quite sizeable, with guarantees given by the developed G-20 countries to the financial sector, for example, estimated to equal 11 per cent of their GDP (see Table E .3). On none of the support measures listed in Table E .3 did the amount pledged by G-20 developing countries reach 1 per cent of their GDP.
To the extent that the financial sector bailout prevented a financial meltdown and shored up aggregate demand, it helped sustain developed countries' demand for imports, including those originating from G-20 developing countries. However, one concern is whether these measures represented a form of policy substitution where, in lieu of trade measures subject to multilateral rules, other measures which can have similar discriminatory trade effects were used instead. Rose and Wieladek (2011) have argued that one consequence of the bailouts has been to reduce cross-border lending and to lead to a form of financial-sector protectionism. Furthermore, these financial sector bailouts may have had discriminatory effects on merchandise trade as well.
Chor and Manova (2012) have shown that countries experiencing greater financial stress, as reflected for example by higher interbank lending rates, exported less to the United States during the peak of the crisis. These effects were especially pronounced in sectors that required extensive external financing, with few collateralizable assets or limited access to trade credit. This suggests that countries which provided sizeable support to their financial sector, which were primarily the advanced economies, would have been able to better maintain their level of exports, thus potentially displacing exports from developing countries.
The monetary response to the crisis was more pronounced, particularly in developed countries. Short-term interest rates were reduced as expected. In addition, central banks in advanced countries turned to unconventional monetary instruments -"quantitative easing". This involved purchases not only of long-term government securities but of more risky and illiquid assets such as mortgages and mortgage-backed securities held by troubled financial institutions. The chief reason for using unconventional policy was that the traditional instrument of monetary policy, the short-term interest rate, had already been reduced to its lowest limit. Some understanding of the magnitude of this unconventional monetary response can be gleaned from the expansion in the size of the balance sheets of the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England.
One side of the balance sheet reflects the assets owned by the bank -government securities, mortgages, mortgage-backed assets, etc. -while the other side reflect its liabilities, the monetary base and equity. The expansion of the central bank's balance sheet therefore reflects an increase in its asset holding (and a corresponding increase in monetary creation). Based on the information available between the end of July 2007 and early 2013, this expansion was enormous as the balance sheets of the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England grew nearly fourfold (from US$ 877 billion to US$ 3.2 trillion) and fivefold (from ₤82 billion to ₤404 billion) respectively.
(c) Why was there no increase in trade protectionism?
In the Bagwell-Staiger (2003) model of counter-cyclical trade policy, there are no other instruments apart from trade policy for countries to manage the business cycle. This suggests a way to reconcile the theory with the facts. What the coordinated macroeconomic response did was to mitigate the downturn in the business cycle. The fact that nearly all the G-20 countries ramped up fiscal spending and cut interest rates meant that the stimulus was global and coordinated, thus helping to mitigate more effectively global economic weakness. Box E.3 discusses the role of global policy coordination and trade reform in addressing current account imbalances, which has been identified as one of the possible factors that contributed to the global crisis. In the context of the Bagwell-Staiger model, this means that the long-term benefits from trade cooperation remain substantial so the incentives remained tilted towards cooperation and against short-term opportunism.
An alternative explanation for the limited trade protectionism in response to the crisis is provided by Limão and Maggi (2013 Home governments keen to advance the interests of these exporters will not want to increase tariffs on the imported inputs that they use. Furthermore, in global value chains, a country's exports are also inputs to producers in foreign countries. These foreign producers will have an interest in seeing low or zero tariffs in the source country as this will keep their input costs low and so will lobby against trade restrictions. The Gawande et al. study finds strong empirical evidence that the demand for cheap inputs by downstream users and the demand for a country's exports by vertically specialized exporters in partner countries exerted countervailing pressure against increases in applied tariffs.
Finally, another perspective on the muted protectionist response by developing countries is whether protectionism would have been helpful in promoting economic recovery. If it would not, this would provide another explanation for why we have not seen a reincarnation of Depression-era protectionism. The crisis has still to run its full course so any conclusions will be preliminary in nature.
One measure of economic recovery is the growth in trade. The relationship between export performance and G-20 developing countries' trade policy stances, represented by the number of trade-restrictive measures, is shown

Box E.3: Policy solutions to global imbalances
Large and enduring current account 11 imbalances (both surpluses and deficits) have been observed in many leading economies since the 1980s. The evolution of global imbalances since 1990 is illustrated by Figure E .11, which shows current account surpluses and deficits as a percentage of global GDP for large developed and developing economies, including Brazil, China, the European Union, India, Japan, Russia, Saudi Arabia and the United States. 12 Figure E.11: Current account surpluses/deficits of selected countries (in per cent of world GDP)
in Figure E .12. Judging by the negative slope of the line plotting export performance against the number of trade-restrictive measures applied by a country, there is no evidence that G-20 developing countries which took a more restrictive stance performed better than countries which took less restrictive measures.
Conclusions
Trade openness in itself has ambiguous effects on the macroeconomic volatility of developing countries. Nevertheless, in the 2008-09 crisis, trade proved to be a transmission mechanism of economic shocks originating in developed markets to producers and traders in developing economies. The dramatic reduction in international trade in the wake of the crisis would have been a lot worse if trade protectionism of the scale experienced in the Great Depression had been seen. For developing countries, this could have erased a big part of the development gains from the last decade.
On the whole, there was no large-scale outbreak of trade protectionism during the crisis, particularly in comparison with the experience during the Great Depression. With respect to developing countries, four reasons may explain why these countries did not systematically raise trade barriers during the crisis. If governments are risk averse, they have more to gain by sticking to a trade agreement, i.e. abiding by their WTO commitments, when the economic environment becomes more volatile. Empirical evidence suggests that being a member of the WTO acted as a restraint to the use of trade-restrictive actions during the crisis.
Secondly, other policy instruments better suited to managing falling demand and macroeconomic volatility were available to developing countries. There was a coordinated response by the G-20 countries on macroeconomic policy and on trade with their commitment to refrain from erecting new trade barriers. Thirdly, the spread of global value chains increased linkages among countries, creating a common interest in preventing the spread of protectionism. Finally, raising trade barriers would have proven to be ineffective in promoting economic recovery in the medium to longer term.
Despite the positive role of the WTO and its trade monitoring exercise in keeping traditional instruments of protectionism at bay, the possibility of using other measures unconstrained by WTO rules -or policy substitution -suggests that the world should remain vigilant. 
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Endnotes 1 This trend rate of growth is not deterministic and can vary over time ("stochastic") . Various ways of decomposing the trend and cyclical components of GDP have been developed in the macroeconomic literature (Hodrick and Prescott, 1980; Baxter and King, 1999; Christiano and Fitzgerald, 2003) .
2 Financial openness is of course the other channel through which international shocks can be propagated to other economies. However, financial markets also offer the possibility to absorb shocks via diversification and inter-temporal substitution. It is, therefore, interesting which effect dominates. The full effect of financial development and integration is most likely to be positive for countries above a certain development threshold (Ayhan Kose et al., 2011) . Therefore, there is a large body of literature which recommends the need to strengthen domestic financial markets before opening them up (Rodrik and Subramanian, 2009 ).
3 The "bullwhip effect" is also sometimes referred to as the "whiplash" or "whipsaw" effect. 
